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This paper examines the effect of insider trading restrictions on corpo-
rate risk-taking. Using a cross-country sample of 38 countries over the
1990 to 2003 period, we ﬁnd that corporate risk-taking is positively re-
lated to insider trading restrictions. This ﬁnding is robust to alternative
regression speciﬁcations and sample periods, to the use of alternative
measures of insider trading restrictions and risk-taking incentives, and
to controls for possible endogeneity. Further investigation suggests
that the relation between insider trading restrictions and corporate
risk-taking is inﬂuenced by cross-sectional differences in stock market
development and legal origin, and that the increase in risk-taking is
beneﬁcial to ﬁrms. In conclusion, this paper highlights the role of
insider trading restrictions as an important determinant of corporate
risk-taking.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Recent studies in the accounting and ﬁnance literature examine the real and economic effects of insider
trading restrictions among ﬁrms around the world. Some of the beneﬁts obtained by ﬁrms in countries that
have enforced insider trading laws include a lower cost of raising external equity capital (Bhattacharya and
Daouk, 2002); increases in analyst following (Bushman et al., 2005); less concentrated equity ownership
and increases in market liquidity (Beny, 2007); higher ﬁrm value (Beny, 2008); increases in the information
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 35 (2015) 125–142
☆ Part of this work was completed when the author was at the City University of Hong Kong. The author is grateful to Balasingham
Balachandran (theGuest Editor), Konari Uchida, Takato Hiraki, an anonymous referee, and seminar participants at the KyushuUniversity,
the 2014 Global Finance Conference (Dubai), the 2014 FinancialMarkets and Corporate Governance Conference (Brisbane), and the 2014
Asian Finance Association Conference (Bali) for their helpful comments and discussions. The author also acknowledges ﬁnancial support
from a City University of Hong Kong Strategic Research Grant (Project No: 7008155) and the Singapore Management University DART
Fund as well as editorial assistance from Armstrong-Hilton Limited. All remaining errors are the author's own.
⁎ Tel.: +65 6808 5449; fax: +65 6828 0600.
E-mail address: yuantok@smu.edu.sg.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacﬁn.2014.11.004
0927-538X/© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal
j ourna l homepage: www.e lsev ie r .com/ locate /pacf in
Published in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 2015 November, Volume 35, Issue A, Pages 125-142
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.11.004
contained in stock prices (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009);more efﬁcient investment decisions and subsequent
improvements in accounting performance (Chen et al., 2013); and increases in timely-loss recognition
(Jayaraman, 2012). Moreover, ﬁrms in countries with more restrictive insider trading regulations tend to
have a lower stock market volatility (Du and Wei, 2004), higher executive compensation and a better
equity-based component of the compensation package (Denis and Xu, 2013).
There are also a growing number of studies that explore the role of corporate governance in corporate
risk-taking activities (John et al., 2008; Bargeron et al., 2010; Acharya et al., 2011; Boubakri et al, 2013).
Speciﬁcally, these studies examine the effects of shareholder rights, accounting disclosure rules, law and
order indices, regulation change (in the form of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act), creditor rights, and political institu-
tions on corporate risk-taking. However, there is still no empirical study that examines the effect of insider
trading restrictions on managerial risk-taking incentives.
A change in insider trading restrictions is described as an exogenous “shock to enforcement” (Jayaraman,
2012, pp. 77) and to the overall level of corporate governance in a particular country. The literature yields
mixed ﬁndings on the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk-taking, and thus exam-
iningwhether insider trading restrictions inﬂuence corporate risk-taking is an interesting empirical exercise.1
This is the main research question that this study seeks to address. We use ﬁnancial data for non-ﬁnancial
ﬁrms across 38 countries for the sample period from 1990 to 2003 and follow existing studies (Du and Wei,
2004; Denis and Xu, 2013) in using the cross-country survey data from the Global Competitiveness Report
on the prevalence of insider trading as the measure of insider trading restrictions. Our measure of corporate
risk-taking incentives is the volatility of earnings, which is calculated as the country and industry-adjusted
standard deviation of the return on assets over 5-year overlapping periods.
The main empirical evidence reveals that ﬁrms in countries with more restrictive insider trading regula-
tions exhibit higher earnings volatility than their counterparts in countries with less restrictive regulations.
In terms of economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the value of the insider trading restric-
tion index leads to an increase in the value of earnings volatility by about 6.6% relative to the mean value of
earnings volatility for the entire sample. This ﬁnding corroborates the broader results that studies such as
John et al. (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2013) document that more effective corporate governance (in the
form of stronger insider trading restrictions) encourages managers to engage in projects that involve more
risk-taking and could potentially add to shareholder value. Additional results suggest that our ﬁnding is rela-
tively robust to changes in empirical speciﬁcations and sample periods.
We further employ two alternative proxies for insider trading restrictions: the insider trading law index
(Beny, 2004) and the strictness of the insider trading law index (Durnev and Nain, 2007) and ﬁnd that the
positive relation between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking continues to hold for both
alternative measures. Moreover, we also use two alternative measures of managerial risk-taking incentives,
namely, the difference between the maximum and minimum return on assets over a 5-year interval and
the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets. The results from these robustness tests
do not alter the conclusion that insider trading restrictions are positively associated with both measures of
corporate risk-taking.
We also address the issue that our main results could be affected by endogeneity by implementing two
separate tests: exploiting an exogenous change in the insider trading restriction index and estimating a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression model. Both approaches produce robust and consistent results
and reinforce the notion that corporate risk-taking incentives are positively related to insider trading
restrictions.
Finally, the results of extant studies suggest that themain ﬁnding of a positive relationship between insid-
er trading restrictions and managerial risk-taking incentives is not uniform across countries. As a result, we
further investigate whether the main result is inﬂuenced by cross-sectional differences in stock market
development and legal tradition. Our results show that the positive relationship between insider trading
restrictions and corporate risk-taking only exists for ﬁrms in countrieswith a high level of stockmarket devel-
opment and common law countries, that is, countries with a strong institutional infrastructure. Interestingly,
we document the opposite ﬁnding for ﬁrms in countries with a weak institutional infrastructure, with insider
trading restrictions being negatively associated with corporate risk-taking for ﬁrms in these countries. These
1 While John et al. (2008) document that corporate governance has a positive effect on risk-taking, Bargeron et al. (2010) and Acharya
et al. (2011) ﬁnd opposite results.
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results bear resemblance to those of Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) and highlight the asymmetric relationship
between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking.
In general, the ﬁndings of this study contribute to the existing literature by shedding further light on the
relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk-taking. In particular, this study provides the
ﬁrst empirical evidence on whether insider trading restrictions inﬂuence managerial risk-taking incentives.
This research question is relevant not only to academics but also to regulators and corporate managers. A
better understanding of the issue will allow regulators to evaluate whether reforms in the rules and regula-
tions (such as insider trading laws) are needed to promote investments and growth. We offer some prelimi-
nary evidence that the increase in risk-taking is beneﬁcial due to themore efﬁcient capital allocation decisions
that are subsequently made by ﬁrms in countries with stricter insider trading laws.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review and de-
velops the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and the measures of insider trading restrictions
and corporate risk-taking. Section 4 analyzes the relationship between insider trading restrictions and corpo-
rate risk-taking. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
Recent studies focus on the role of corporate governance in inﬂuencingmanagerial risk-taking incentives.
Theoretical models argue for both a positive and a negative relationship between corporate governance and
managerial risk-taking incentives. The improvement of corporate governance leads to an increase inmanage-
rial risk-taking incentives for several reasons. When the level of investor protection is poor, insiders have less
motivation to invest in risky projects to safeguard their private beneﬁts, even though the projectsmaybe value
enhancing. This problem becomesmore severe if the dominant owners exert their control through a pyrami-
dal ownership structure, dual-class shares, or cross-shareholdings (Morck et al., 2000; Morck et al., 2005;
Stulz, 2005). As corporate governance improves, the incentives for insiders to expropriate corporate resources
for their private beneﬁts lessen (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2003). Thus, insiders become more motivated to
take on a more aggressive investment policy and invest in riskier projects.
John et al. (2008) employ an international sample and report ﬁndings that are consistent with the predic-
tion that as country-level investor protection improves, managers havemore incentive to take on investment
projects that are riskier but ultimately value increasing. A related study by Boubakri et al. (2013) also reveals a
positive relationship between political institutions and corporate risk-taking.
Several studies identify insider trading as an inefﬁcient private beneﬁt of control that has the potential to
aggravate the agency conﬂicts between insiders and shareholders (Easterbrook, 1985; Beny, 2007). For
example, allowing for insider trading only motivates managers to make project selections that increase
their trading proﬁts, even if these projects are ultimately inefﬁcient and value reducing (Bebchuk and
Fershtman, 1990; Maug, 2002). Furthermore, insider trading discourages outside investors from obtaining
private information, and thus has the effect of dampening information-based trading (Fishman and
Hagerty, 1992). According to these arguments, more restrictive insider trading regulations in a country should
result in a positive shock to that country's legal enforcement and the overall effectiveness of corporate gover-
nance (Jayaraman, 2012), which in turn fosters investment in innovative initiatives that stimulates economic
growth.
The compensation package received by top executives can also affect their risk-taking incentives. A recent
study by Denis and Xu (2013) ﬁnds that more stringent insider trading regulations lead to an increase in the
use of equity-based incentives. Several studies (such as Low, 2009; Gormley et al., 2013) provide strong
evidence that equity-based compensation is used to alleviate the agency costs associated with managerial
risk-aversion and to encourage managers to take on greater risks. Linking these results together also leads
to the prediction that insider trading restrictions are positively related to corporate risk-taking. Thus, the
ﬁrst part of the ﬁrst hypothesis (risk-increasing hypothesis) is stated as follows.
H1a. There is a positive association between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking.
Tunneling activities are prevalent among ﬁrms organized in a pyramidal ownership structure, especially
those located in countries with weak investor protection (Johnson et al., 2000; Friedman et al., 2003). Such
activities entail higher risks. Stronger legal protection helps to prevent dominant insiders from engaging in
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tunneling activities, which implies that managerial risk-taking incentives are also restricted. Bargeron et al.
(2010) and Acharya et al. (2011) document results that are consistent with the prediction of a negative rela-
tionship between corporate governance and managerial risk-taking incentives. Speciﬁcally, Bargeron et al.
(2010) document that the implementation of the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act in 2002 has curtailed managers'
incentives to undertake risky investment projects. Acharya et al. (2011) also document that ﬁrms in countries
with stronger creditor rights have a lower leverage and cash ﬂow risk, and that managers have more incen-
tives to increase investments in risk-reducing ventures, such as diversifying acquisitions and increasing the
acquisition of assets with higher recovery rates.
A seminal study by Manne (1966) argues against the prohibition of insider trading, as the ability to buy
and sell insider shares has the positive effect of encouraging insiders to undertake innovative projects that
will hopefully increase ﬁrm value in the future, thereby enhancing their value in themanagerial labormarket.
Bebchuk and Fershtman (1994) speciﬁcally develop amodel that explores whether insider trading affects in-
siders' ex-ante project selection decisions. In particular, they predict that insider trading increases the incen-
tives of insiders to select investment projects that involve higher risks, as it enhances their returns (proﬁts) if
they can obtain information about the results of investment projects much earlier than the market. In other
words, insider trading provides an “option” for insiders, and the value of this option increases with the
cash ﬂow risk associated with the investment project. However, if insider trading is restricted, it is expected
to decrease the incentives of managers to take on risky projects. Thus, the second part of the ﬁrst hypothesis
(risk-reducing hypothesis) is stated as follows:
H1b. There is a negative association between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking.
The ﬁndings from studies that examine the effects of insider trading restrictions on ﬁrms' analyst follow-
ings (Bushman et al., 2005) and the information contained in stock prices (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2009) con-
tend that the main ﬁndings are affected by cross-sectional differences in institutional infrastructure.
Speciﬁcally, the positive relationship between insider trading restrictions and analyst following (stock price
informativeness) is more pronounced for ﬁrms in emerging markets (developed countries). In this respect,
we conjecture that the effect of insider trading restrictions on corporate risk-taking is not uniform across
all countries. This leads to our second hypothesis:
H2. The relationship between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking is different for ﬁrms in
countries with weak institutions than for their counterparts in countries with strong institutions.
3. Data and variable construction
This section describes the sample data and the construction of the country-level measures of insider trad-
ing restrictions; other country-level variables that are used as proxies for investor protection, accounting stan-
dards, economic development, law and order, and culture; and ﬁrm-level variables that are used as control
variables in the regression tests. The detailed descriptions of the main variables are provided in Appendix A.
Table 1 shows the sample distribution by country and the summary statistics for the insider trading restriction
variables.
3.1. Insider trading restriction variables
The main independent variable of interest in this study is the insider trading restriction (ITR) index. For
each country in the sample, we follow Denis and Xu (2013) and construct the index from the Global Compet-
itiveness Report for 1996, 1998, and 1999.2 Essentially, the report contains survey responses from executives
around the world to the following question:
Insider trading is not common in the domestic market (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree).
Wedeﬁne the insider trading restriction index in a particular country as themean score of all executives in
that country for the survey question. As the index values are only available for three years (1996, 1998, and
2 This index is also used in two related studies (Du and Wei, 2004; and Beny, 2008).
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1999) and the sample covers the 1990 to 2003 period, we assign the values of the index in 1996 as the corre-
sponding index values for 1990 to 1995 and for 1997. Likewise, the values of the index in 1999 are used as the
corresponding values for 2000 to 2003. Countries with higher ITR index values are considered to have more
restrictive insider trading regulations.
As shown in Table 1, themean value of ITR increases from 4.00 (with a standard deviation of 0.75) in 1996
to 4.53 (with a standard deviation of 0.88) in 1999. This suggests that, on average, there is an increase in in-
sider trading regulations over the sample period.3 The cross-sectional variation of the ITR index across the
countries is quite wide, with a minimum value of 2.49 (India in 1996) and a maximum value of 6.00
(Denmark in 1999).
3 Nonetheless, there are six countries with a decrease in ITR index values, for example, Hong Kong (from 4.17 in 1996 to 3.94 in 1999)
and Thailand (from 4.24 in 1996 to 3.29 in 1999).
Table 1
Sample distribution by country.
Country N ITR ITL IT_ENF ITS
1999 1998 1996
Argentina 62 3.88 4.05 3.21 2 1995 2
Australia 2627 5.59 5.27 5.04 3 1996 3
Austria 222 4.83 4.80 4.50 2 . 0
Belgium 681 5.41 5.00 4.36 3 1994 3
Canada 787 5.55 5.03 4.45 3 1976 3
Chile 756 4.16 4.56 4.56 . 1996 .
Colombia 13 3.42 3.97 3.36 . . .
Denmark 814 6.00 5.79 5.27 3 1996 3
Finland 889 5.53 5.26 4.58 3 1993 3
France 4033 5.17 4.69 3.87 3 1975 3
Germany 3895 5.24 5.80 4.35 3 1995 3
Greece 40 3.41 3.50 3.46 2 1996 2
Hong Kong 3017 3.94 4.32 4.17 2 1994 2
India 494 3.53 3.42 2.49 2 1998 0
Indonesia 1061 3.56 3.33 2.82 2 1996 2
Ireland 568 5.19 5.58 4.40 3 . 0
Israel 214 4.39 4.08 3.48 2 1989 2
Italy 1015 4.38 3.88 2.92 3 1996 3
Japan 10,717 5.26 5.05 4.85 2 1990 2
Korea (South) 1902 4.10 3.73 3.81 3 1988 3
Malaysia 3345 3.42 3.65 3.69 2 1996 2
Mexico 38 3.54 3.49 3.14 1 . 0
Netherlands 1209 5.20 4.62 4.63 3 1994 3
New Zealand 422 5.40 5.52 5.30 2 . 0
Norway 853 4.24 4.67 4.08 1 1990 1
Peru 25 3.99 3.79 3.61 1 1994 1
Philippines 298 3.48 3.32 2.79 3 . 0
Portugal 271 4.37 4.52 3.71 3 . 0
Singapore 2048 5.58 5.54 5.10 3 1978 3
South Africa 1490 3.74 3.87 3.76 2 . 0
Spain 933 4.68 4.42 3.64 2 1998 0
Sweden 1317 5.58 5.48 4.35 2 1990 2
Switzerland 1216 4.67 5.30 4.80 3 1995 3
Taiwan 1161 3.18 3.42 3.10 3 1989 3
Thailand 1069 3.29 3.25 4.24 3 1993 3
Turkey 503 3.58 4.26 3.00 . 1996 .
United Kingdom 12,278 5.85 5.64 4.47 3 1981 3
United States 34,221 5.64 5.13 4.63 3 1961 3
Total 96,504
Mean 2540 4.53 4.50 4.00 2.46 1.89
Std dev 5871 0.88 0.81 0.75 0.66 1.25
This table presents the distribution of the sample by country and the summary statistics for the measures of the insider trading
restrictions. N is the number of ﬁrm–year observations. The deﬁnitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. The sample period
covers from 1990 to 2003.
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We employ two other measures of insider trading restrictions in the robustness tests. ITL is the insider
trading law index from Beny (2004). It is constructed as the sum of three indicator variables, Tipee, Tipping,
and Criminal, which constitute the main elements of insider trading law.4 ITL is only available for 35 out of
the 38 countries in our sample, and has a mean value of 2.46 (with a standard deviation of 0.66). Three coun-
tries have the minimum ITL value (1) and 19 have the maximum value (3).
We also obtain dates for the initial enforcement (IT_ENF) of insider trading laws from Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002). As observed from Table 1, insider trading laws are only enforced in 30 out of the 38 countries.
Eight countries (Austria, Colombia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, and South Africa)
have never enforced insider trading laws. From these enforcement dates, we further construct two dummy
variables: ENF1which equals 1 if insider trading laws were enforced for the ﬁrst time in a particular country
by the end of 1996, and 0 otherwise; and ENF2 which equals 1 for years after and including the ﬁrst-year of
enforcement of insider trading laws in a particular country, and 0 otherwise. Following Durnev and Nain
(2007), the strictness of insider trading law index (ITS) is calculated as the product of ITL and ENF1. The
mean value of ITS is 1.89, with a standard deviation of 1.25. Nine countries have the lowest ITS value
(0) and 16 countries have the highest value (3).
Denis andXu (2013) argue that “Because ITRhas the potential to capture the joint impact of insider trading
laws, their enforcements, and other factors such as culture and information environment, it is arguably amore
complete measure of insider trading restrictions than ITL.” (pp. 96). Nevertheless, one limitation of the ITR
variable is that it is based on survey data which is subject to more biases. In particular, the respondents to
the survey increased from about 2800 executives of ﬁrms in 58 countries for the year 1996, to about 4000 ex-
ecutives in 59 countries for the year 1999. Therefore,we acknowledge that the changes in the value of ITRmay
simply reﬂect the differences in the sample of respondents, and not changes in the insider trading restrictions.
We use an instrumental variable approach in one of the robustness test to mitigate this issue.
3.2. Sample
We merge the insider trading restriction variables with ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial data on international ﬁrms
from Worldscope (provided by Thomson Reuters). Speciﬁcally, for each ﬁrm (i) and for each year (t) over
the sample period from 1990 to 2003, we obtain data on the book value of total assets; the book value of
equity; the market value of equity; research and development expenditure; earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization; total sales; and total debt, which includes both short-term debt and long-
term debt. We then convert the ﬁnancial data on the international ﬁrms to US$ using the average exchange
rate for the respective year. We restrict the data to the year 2003 to be consistent with prior studies, such as
Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) and Jayaraman (2012), and because of the global ﬁnancial crisis that occurred
in year 2008.
We further require our sample to have non-missing ﬁrm–year observations for the proxies for corporate
risk-taking, which are elaborated in more detail in the next sub-section. Consistent with previous studies,
we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC 6000 to 6999) and utility ﬁrms (SIC 4400 to 5500), ﬁrms with a negative
book value of equity, and small ﬁrms (those with a book value of total assets of less than US$10 million).
After these screening procedures, our ﬁnal sample consists of 96,504 ﬁrm–year observations for ﬁrms in 38
countries. The United States, United Kingdom, and Japan are the three countries that constitute the largest
number of ﬁrm–year observations, in contrast to Colombia, Greece, Mexico, and Peru, which each has less
than 50 ﬁrm–year observations.
3.3. Corporate risk-taking variables
Consistentwith recent studies (Faccio et al., 2011; Boubakri et al., 2013), ourmainmeasure of corporate risk-
taking is earnings volatility (RISK), which is calculated as the country and industry-adjusted standard deviation
of eachﬁrm's return on assets (ROA, deﬁned as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets) over
5-year overlapping periods. We further require each ﬁrm to have at least 5 years of observations for ROA to
be included in the sample. Moreover, we control for the effect of each country and each industry's
4 The detailed deﬁnitions of these variables are available in Beny (2004).
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economic cycle. In other words, for each year t, we ﬁrst compute the average value of ROA across all ﬁrms in a
particular industry i (ROAi,t) as well as the average value of ROA across all ﬁrms in a particular country c
(ROAc,t). Then, we calculate the value of the country and industry-adjusted ROA of ﬁrm a (belonging to
industry i in country c) in year t as ROAa,t− ROAc,t− ROAi,t.
As an illustration, the value of RISK for ﬁrm A in 1990 (the ﬁrst year in the sample period) is calculated as
the country and industry-adjusted standard deviation of the ROAs for ﬁrmA over the 5-year period from 1990
to 1994. The next value of RISK (in year 1991) is calculated for the interval 1991 to 1995, and so on. Eventually,
the ﬁnal value of RISK (in year 2003) is calculated for the interval 2003 to 2007.
Following Faccio et al. (2011) and Boubakri et al. (2013), we employ 2 other proxies for managerial risk-
taking incentives: (i) RISK2 and (ii) RISK3. The ﬁrst alternative proxy (RISK2) is calculated by computing the
difference between the maximum and minimum ROAs over a 5-year interval. The second alternative proxy
is calculated as the ratio of research and development expenditure to total assets.
3.4. Control variables
We use 6 country-level variables as control variables in the regression analysis: LAWORDER, GDPG, ANTISELF,
ACTSTD, UA, and INDIV. LAWORDER is the law and order index obtained from the International Country Risk
Guide (ICRG, 2008), where higher index values represent countries with more effective law and order systems.
GDPG is the GDP growth rate, calculated as the annual percentage change in the gross domestic product,
measured in 2005 constant US$, and obtained from the World Bank database. ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing
index from Djankov et al. (2008), which has been widely used as a proxy for country-level investor protection.
Higher values of the index indicate more effective investor protection. ACTSTD is the accounting standard index
from La Porta et al. (1998). Higher values of the index suggestmore effective accounting disclosure rules.UA and
INDIV are the uncertainty avoidance and individualism index from Hofstede (2001). Higher values on UA
represent greater tendencies to follow rule and conform to social norm, while higher values on INDIV symbolize
greater importance of autonomy and egocentric behavior.
Other ﬁrm-level control variables include insider ownership (CLOSE, deﬁned as the percentage of
shares closely held by insiders of the company, obtained fromWorldscope); return on assets (ROA), leverage
(LEV, deﬁned as the ratio of total debt to total assets); sales growth (SALESG, deﬁned as the average percentage
change in total sales over the sample period); and ﬁrm size (SIZE, deﬁned as the natural logarithm of total
assets in millions of US$).
3.5. Summary statistics and correlations analysis
The summary statistics of the main ﬁrm-level variables are displayed in Table 2. We report the mean, me-
dian, standard deviation, and the 25th and 75th percentile values for each variable. All the ﬁrm-level control
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile levels to mitigate the problem of outliers in the data.
The main risk-taking variable, RISK, has a mean (median) of 0.065 (0.046), with a standard deviation of
0.062. The other risk-taking variables (RISK2 and RISK3) also display wide cross-sectional variation. The
Table 2
Summary statistics of the main ﬁrm-level variables.
Variable N Mean Median Std dev 25% 75%
RISK 96,504 0.065 0.046 0.062 0.027 0.080
RISK2 96,504 0.156 0.110 0.145 0.064 0.191
RISK3 96,504 0.021 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.012
CLOSE 96,504 0.383 0.368 0.252 0.172 0.574
ROA 96,504 0.060 0.073 0.154 0.029 0.120
LEV 96,504 0.236 0.221 0.180 0.082 0.358
SALESG 96,504 0.161 0.068 0.567 −0.023 0.196
SIZE 96,504 5.806 5.637 1.819 4.435 6.990
This table presents the summary statistics of the main ﬁrm-level variables. N is the number of ﬁrm–year observations. The deﬁnitions of
the variables are described in Appendix A. The sample period covers from 1990 to 2003.
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mean (median) of RISK2 is 0.156 (0.110) and the standard deviation is 0.145. The mean (median) of RISK3 is
relatively smaller at 0.021 (0) and the standard deviation is 0.055.
In terms of the other control variables, insiders hold an average of about 38% (median=37%) of the shares
of theﬁrms,with a standarddeviation of 0.25. The earnings of theﬁrms in our international sample are in gen-
eral positive, as themean (median) ROA is 0.060 (0.073) and the standard deviation is 0.154. The average ﬁrm
has a leverage of 0.236 (with a standard deviation of 0.180), a sales growth rate of 0.161 (with a standard de-
viation of 0.567), and a size of 5.81 (with a standard deviation of 1.82).
Table 3 presents Pearson's correlations among the insider trading restriction variables, corporate risk-
taking variables, and other ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables. All the correlations (except for that between
CLOSE and SALESG) are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As expected, all three measures of insider
trading restrictions (and corporate risk-taking) are positively and strongly correlated with each another.
More importantly, the correlation between ITR and RISK is positive and statistically signiﬁcant,which provides
preliminary evidence that corporate risk-taking increases with insider trading restrictions.5
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking
The ﬁrst empirical task is to conduct a multivariate regression analysis by examining how insider trading
restrictions inﬂuence corporate risk-taking. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following baseline regression
speciﬁcation:
RISKi;t ¼ ao þ a1ITRi;t þ a2ROAi;t þ a3LEVi;t þ a4SALESGi;t þ a5SIZEi;t
þ
X
Ctryiþ
X
Indi þ
X
Yrt þ εi;t ; ð1Þ
where for eachﬁrm i at time t, RISK is the primary risk-taking variable of interest (country and industry-adjusted
earnings volatility); ITR is the country-level insider trading restrictions; ROA is the earnings; LEV is the leverage;
SALESG is the average sales growth rate; and SIZE is the ﬁrm size.
The primary coefﬁcient of interest is the coefﬁcient a1, whichmeasures the sensitivity of earnings volatility
to insider trading restrictions. As theory predicts that the coefﬁcient can be either positive or negative, we do
notmake any directional prediction about the sign of coefﬁcient a1. The baseline regression is estimated using
an ordinary least-squares (OLS) model, which also includes country (Ctry), industry (Ind), and year (Yr) ﬁxed
effects. The purpose of using country ﬁxed effects is to control for other country-speciﬁc and time-invariant
Table 3
Correlations analysis.
Variable RISK RISK2 RISK3 ITR ITL ITS CLOSE ROA LEV SALESG
RISK2 0.984
RISK3 0.273 0.272
ITR 0.123 0.113 0.148
ITL 0.126 0.120 0.121 0.283
ITS 0.103 0.100 0.122 0.323 0.757
CLOSE −0.059 −0.058 −0.168 −0.208 −0.226 −0.221
ROA −0.342 −0.331 −0.198 −0.110 0.009 −0.027 0.024
LEV −0.083 −0.082 −0.211 −0.032 −0.073 −0.031 −0.018 −0.079
SALESG 0.103 0.106 0.137 −0.007 0.043 0.023 0.000 0.000 −0.034
SIZE −0.265 −0.263 −0.105 0.075 −0.112 −0.070 −0.220 0.102 0.264 −0.057
This table presents Pearson's correlations of the insider trading restriction variables, corporate risk-taking variables, and other ﬁrm-level
control variables.
5 We also split the sample based on the sample mean value of ITR (4.79) and partition the sample into low (below mean) and high
(above mean) ITR groups. The corresponding values of RISK for the low and high sub-samples are 0.062 and 0.070 and the difference
(0.008) is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The univariate analysis offers further preliminary evidence of the positive relationship
between ITR and RISK.
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variables that previous studies have documented as inﬂuencing risk-taking incentives (see John et al., 2008).6
The industry classiﬁcation follows Fama and French (1997). Following Faccio et al. (2011) and Boubakri et al.
(2013), unless otherwise stated, the standard errors of the coefﬁcients in the regression speciﬁcations are
clustered by ﬁrm, to alleviate problems of heteroskedasticity and within-ﬁrm serial correlation.
Model (1) in Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of the baselinemodel (Eq. (1)). The results show
that insider trading restrictions are positively associated with corporate risk-taking, as the coefﬁcient a1 is
positive (magnitude= 0.006) and statistically signiﬁcant (t-statistic= 5.34), at least at the 1% level. This em-
pirical ﬁnding supports the risk-increasing hypothesis (H1a), which suggests thatmanagers of ﬁrms in coun-
tries in which insider trading is more restricted display greater incentives to engage in risk-taking activities
compared with their peers in countries with weaker insider trading restrictions.
We ﬁnd that the results are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but are also quite substantial in terms of eco-
nomic signiﬁcance. The average value of RISK for our sample is 0.065 (see Table 2). Using the coefﬁcient esti-
mate of ITR inModel (1) and assuming that the other variables remain constant, an increase in the value of ITR
by one standard deviation (0.71) leads to an increase in RISK of 0.004, or about 6.6% relative to themean value
of RISK for the entire sample (0.065, see Table 2).7
As the presence of large and concentrated shareholders may affect managerial risk-taking incentives, we
include an additional explanatory variable (CLOSE) and estimate the following modiﬁed baseline regression
speciﬁcation:
RISKi;t ¼ ao þ a1ITRi;t þ a2CLOSEi;t þ a4ROAi;t þ a5LEVi;t þ a6SALESGi;t þ a7SIZEi;t
þ
X
Ctryi þ
X
Indi þ
X
Yrt þ εi;t ; ð2Þ
where for each ﬁrm i at time t, CLOSE is the percentage of closely held shares, and the other variables are as de-
ﬁned earlier. The results of the estimation of Eq. (2) using OLS with country, industry, and year ﬁxed effects are
presented in Model (2) of Table 4. The coefﬁcient of CLOSE is negatively and signiﬁcantly associated with RISK,
indicating that the presence of concentrated shareholders impedes corporate risk-taking initiatives (Stulz,
2005).More importantly, despite the inclusion of CLOSE, we continue to ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient of ITR is positive
and statistically signiﬁcant, with a magnitude and signiﬁcance level similar to those found in Model (1).
Thus far, the empirical results are supportive of the notion that stronger insider trading restrictions have a
positive impact on managerial risk-taking incentives, after controlling for other time-invariant country-
speciﬁc variables that may also be correlated with the dependent variable (proxies for corporate risk-
taking) using speciﬁcations that include country ﬁxed effects.8
To mitigate the concern that themain variable of interest (insider trading restrictions) captures the effect
of other country-speciﬁc variables, we follow Boubakri et al. (2013) and include two additional country-level
explanatory variables (GDPG and LAWORDER) and estimate the following modiﬁed regression speciﬁcation:
RISKi;t ¼ ao þ a1ITRi;t þ a2CLOSEi;t þ a3ROAi;t þ a4LEVi;t þ a5SALESGi;t þ a6SIZEi;t þ a7GDPGi;t
þ a8LAWORDERi;t þ
X
Indiþ
X
Yrt þ εi;t ; ð3Þ
where GDPG is the annual growth in the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2005 constant US$ from the
World BankDevelopment Indicator and LAWORDER is the lawand order index, obtained from the Internation-
al Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2008). Both variables are included to control for the level of economic develop-
ment and for the efﬁcacy of rules and regulations across the countries included in the sample.
The results of the estimation of Eq. (3) using the OLS model with industry and year ﬁxed effects are pre-
sented in Model (3) of Table 4.9 We ﬁnd that the main ﬁnding of a positive relation between insider trading
6 The country ﬁxed-effects completely absorb those variables, and any such variables are automatically dropped by the model. Neverthe-
less, we also include these country-level variables in the regression model jointly in a subsequent robustness test, and obtain similar results.
7 The increase in RISK is computed as 0.71 × 0.006 = 0.004= 6.6% × 0.065.
8 We also estimate Eq. (2) using several alternative speciﬁcations, such as the weighted least-squares (WLS) regression (with the
weight attached to each ﬁrm-year set to be equal to the inverse of the total number of ﬁrm-year observations in the country to which
theﬁrmbelongs) and anOLS regressionwith standard errors that are clustered at the country-level. The results (unreported) conﬁrm that
insider trading restrictions are positively associated with corporate risk-taking.
9 We exclude country ﬁxed-effects in the estimation of Eq. (3) due to the inclusion of the time-invariant country-level variable
LAWORDER.
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restrictions and corporate risk-taking remains unaltered, despite the inclusion of the two additional country-
level variables. The signs of the coefﬁcients of both GDPG and LAWORDER are positive, but only GDPG is statis-
tically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. This suggests that economic development also fosters risk-taking activities,
which are supportive of the ﬁnding in John et al. (2008).
For the other ﬁrm-level control variables, we ﬁnd that ROA and SIZE are negatively associated with RISK,
and that SALESG is positively associated with RISK in all three speciﬁcations. However, LEV is not related
with RISK. These ﬁndings (with the exception of that for LEV) are consistent with other recent studies that
examine the cross-country variations in corporate risk-taking (Faccio et al., 2011; Boubakri et al, 2013). In
general, the empirical ﬁndings in Table 4 provide evidence that stronger insider trading restrictions encour-
age corporate risk-taking.
4.2. Alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and controlling for country-level institutions
In this sub-section, we perform several sensitivity analyses. We employ alternative measures of corporate
risk-taking as the dependent variable in the regression, estimate a cross-sectional rather than panel regres-
sion, exclude observations from the three largest countries, and control for various country-speciﬁc variables
that other ﬁndings show affect corporate risk-taking.
First, we follow Faccio et al. (2011) and Boubakri et al. (2013) in replacing RISKwith two alternative ﬁrm-
levelmeasures of risk-taking: RISK2 and RISK3. The deﬁnitions of these alternative proxies are described in the
earlier section.We replace the dependent variable in Eq. (3) with the two alternative proxies and present the
results of the regression estimates in Models (1) and (2) of Table 5. The ﬁndings reveal that the coefﬁcient of
ITR remains positive and signiﬁcant at least at the 1% level in both speciﬁcations. This implies that higher
values of ITR are associated with greater difference between the maximum and minimum values of ROA
(computed over a 5-year interval) and higher investment in research and development, which conﬁrms
the main ﬁnding that corporate risk-taking activities are more prevalent among ﬁrms in countries with
Table 4
Insider trading restrictions and corporate risk taking.
(1) (2) (3)
ITR 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(5.34)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(5.34)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(5.02)
CLOSE −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−5.00)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−4.99)
GDPG 0.021⁎⁎
(2.53)
LAWORDER 0.004
(1.11)
ROA −0.118⁎⁎⁎
(−32.46)
−0.117⁎⁎⁎
(−32.37)
−0.117⁎⁎⁎
(−32.37)
LEV −0.001
(−0.45)
−0.001
(−0.36)
−0.001
(−0.31)
SALESG 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(10.86)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(10.93)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(10.89)
SIZE −0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−31.22)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−31.54)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−31.55)
Country FE Yes Yes No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.299 0.299
Number of observations 96,504 96,504 96,504
This table presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of earnings volatility (RISK) on insider trading restrictions (ITR) and
other control variables. The deﬁnitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. The t-statistic for each coefﬁcient is reported in the
parenthesis and is based on White's heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm.
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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more restrictive insider trading regulations than among their counterparts in countries with less restrictive
regulations.
Rather than estimating a panel data regression, Model (3) of Table 5 displays the results for a cross-
sectional regression using the aggregate value of the variables for each ﬁrm (computed as the mean
value of the variables across the sample period), which results in 14,099 unique observations (ﬁrms).
Similar to the other speciﬁcations, the cross-sectional regression is estimated with additional industry
ﬁxed effect. We ﬁnd that the positive relation between ITR and RISK is stronger in the cross-sectional
regression, with the coefﬁcient of ITR (magnitude = 0.008) being statistically signiﬁcant at the 1%
level (t-statistic = 8.89).
Given that observations from the U.S., U.K., and Japan dominate the sample, we drop observations
from these countries and re-estimate Eq. (3) for the smaller sub-sample. The results, as shown in Model
(4) of Table 5, reveal that the main ﬁndings still remain unchanged, even for the smaller sub-sample of
countries, with the coefﬁcient of ITR (magnitude = 0.004) still being statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level
(t-statistics = 4.68). Hence, the ﬁnding of a positive relation between insider trading restrictions and corpo-
rate risk-taking is not driven by ﬁrms in the three largest countries.
Table 5
Alternative measures for risk-taking and controlling for country-level institutions.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
RISK2 RISK3 Cross-sectional
regression
Excluding U.S., U.K.,
and Japan
Controlling for ANTISELF,
ACTDISC, UA, & INDIV
ITR 0.012⁎⁎⁎
(7.02)
0.009⁎⁎⁎
(15.09)
0.008⁎⁎⁎
(8.89)
0.004⁎⁎⁎
(4.68)
0.002⁎⁎
(2.38)
CLOSE −0.043⁎⁎⁎
(−14.63)
−0.021⁎⁎⁎
(−16.39)
−0.015⁎⁎⁎
(−8.42)
−0.012⁎⁎⁎
(−6.44)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−4.60)
GDPG 0.226⁎⁎⁎
(9.77)
−0.015⁎⁎
(−2.50)
0.345⁎⁎⁎
(10.38)
−0.006
(−0.61)
0.083⁎⁎⁎
(8.84)
LAWORDER −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−3.17)
−0.004⁎⁎⁎
(−5.86)
−0.002⁎
(−1.67)
−0.003⁎⁎⁎
(−2.86)
−0.000
(−0.15)
ANTISELF 0.008⁎⁎⁎
(3.87)
ACTDISC −0.000⁎⁎⁎
(−5.22)
UA −0.031⁎⁎⁎
(−15.89)
INDIV 0.018⁎⁎⁎
(9.04)
ROA −0.260⁎⁎⁎
(−32.40)
−0.056⁎⁎⁎
(−13.48)
−0.152⁎⁎⁎
(−26.17)
−0.116⁎⁎⁎
(−23.68)
−0.117⁎⁎⁎
(−32.67)
LEV −0.007
(−1.53)
−0.042⁎⁎⁎
(−25.09)
−0.004
(−1.63)
0.004
(1.39)
−0.001
(−0.31)
SALESG 0.017⁎⁎⁎
(13.88)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(14.29)
0.009⁎⁎⁎
(5.89)
0.004⁎⁎⁎
(6.98)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(11.57)
SIZE −0.018⁎⁎⁎
(−40.53)
−0.001⁎⁎⁎
(−2.70)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−32.18)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−22.26)
−0.006⁎⁎⁎
(−33.09)
Country FE No No No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Adjusted 0.262 0.317 0.357 0.200 0.290
Number of Observations 96,504 96,504 14,099 39,288 95,418
This table presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results of risk taking incentives on insider trading restrictions (ITR) and
other control variables. Models (1) and (2) use RISK2 and RISK3 as alternative measures of risk-taking, respectively. Model (3) presents
the results of cross-sectional regression. Model (4) excludes observations from the U.S., U.K., and Japan. Model (5) controls for additional
country-level variables. The deﬁnitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. The t-statistic for each coefﬁcient is reported in the
parenthesis and is based on White's heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm.
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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Finally, we further include four additional country-level explanatory variables that proxy for inves-
tor protection (ANTISELF), accounting disclosure (ACTDISC), and culture (UA and INDIV) and estimate
Eq. (4):
RISKi;t ¼ ao þ a1ITRi;t þ a2CLOSEi;t þ a3ROAi;t þ a4LEVi;t þ a5SALESGi;t þ a6SIZEi;t
þ a7GDPGi;t þ a8LAWORDERi þ a9ANTISELFi þ a10ACTSTDia11UAi þ a12INDIVi
þ
X
Indiþ
X
Yrt þ εi;t ;
ð4Þ
where ANTISELF is the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008); ACTSTD is the accounting disclosure
index from La Porta et al. (1998); and UA and INDIV are the uncertainty avoidance and individualism index,
respectively, both obtained from Hofstede (2001). These additional country-level variables are included to
control for the effect of country-level investor protection, accounting disclosure rules, and culture; which
John et al. (2008) and Li et al. (2013) document as being important determinants of managerial risk-taking
incentives. If the effect of insider trading restrictions is already captured in these country-level variables,
then we should not expect the coefﬁcient of ITR to be signiﬁcant.
Once again, Eq. (4) is estimated using the OLS regression model with additional industry and year
ﬁxed effects. The results, as shown in Model (5) of Table 5, suggest that insider trading restrictions have a
signiﬁcant incremental effect on corporate risk-taking, independent of the effects of other country-level
variables that are jointly included in the regression speciﬁcation. Most of the country-level variables are asso-
ciated with corporate risk-taking in the expected manner. Speciﬁcally, positive growth in real GDP and indi-
vidualism encourage managers to engage in risk-taking activities, while strong accounting disclosures and
uncertainty avoidance mitigate risk-taking incentives. These ﬁndings are consistent with that found by
Boubakri et al. (2013) and Li et al. (2013).
4.3. Alternative measures of insider trading restrictions and samples
In this sub-section, we conduct further robustness checks by employing alternative measures of insider
trading restrictions and estimating the regression using alternative samples. First, the results in Table 4 are
based on the time-varying values of ITR. We use the average ITR value computed over 1996, 1998, and 1999
and re-estimate Eq. (3) with industry and year ﬁxed effects exclusively for the 1996 to 1999 period. The re-
sults (unreported) reveal that the positive sign (magnitude = 0.003) and signiﬁcance (t-statistic = 1.66)
of the coefﬁcient of ITR persist.10
The main insider trading restriction measure ITR is compiled from survey data, and could thus be
subject to the behavioral biases of the survey respondents (Denis and Xu, 2013). To provide robustness
tests on the measures of insider trading restrictions, we employ two alternative measures, ITL (the in-
sider trading law index) and ITS (the strictness of insider trading law index); and re-estimate Eq. (3) by
replacing ITR with the two alternative measures. Models (1) to (2) of Table 6 present the results based
on ITL and ITS, respectively. We ﬁnd that the results for ITL and ITS are consistent with that found using
ITR, as both coefﬁcients are positive (magnitudes = 0.010 and 0.004, respectively) and statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% level (t-statistics = 13.62 and 8.98, respectively). The magnitude and signiﬁcance of
the other ﬁrm-level control variables (again, with the exception of LEV) are similar to those shown in
Table 4.
The ﬁrst enforcement of insider trading law can be viewed as an exogenous shock to insider trading re-
strictions. In fact, 22 out of the 38 countries in the sample enforced insider trading law for the ﬁrst time during
the sample period, including 3 countries (Japan, Norway, and Sweden) that did so in the ﬁrst year of the
sample (year 1990). We ﬁnd that corporate risk-taking has increased after those countries (excluding the 3
countries mentioned above) enforce insider trading law for the ﬁrst time. Speciﬁcally, RISK increases from
0.045 prior to enforcement to 0.065 after the enforcement. The difference is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
10 We also re-estimate Eq. (3) for the sub-period covering the years after 1999 only and the results (unreported) still indicate a positive
and signiﬁcant relation between ITR and RISK.
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We also replace ITR by ENF2 and further re-estimate Eq. (3) around the years of enforcement (from t− 3 to
t + 3). We obtain similar results, as the coefﬁcient of ENF2 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%
level (t-statistics = 1.80), as presented in Model (3) of Table 6.
We further acknowledge that many important events occurred during the sample period, such as the
1997–1998 East Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the 2000 dot com bubble. There could be confounding effects as
ROA may change substantially due to these events, implying a higher value for the corporate risk-taking
(RISK) variable. Thus, a positive relation between ITR and RISK may not be related to insider trading
restrictions, but reﬂect the volatile nature of ROA during the crisis-periods. We attempt to control for these
events by splitting the sample into two: the ﬁrst sub-sample includes observations that use ROA during the
crisis years (observations in the year 1993–2000) and the second sub-sample includes observations that
use ROAs during the non-crisis years (1990–1992 and 2001–2003). We re-estimate Eq. (3) for both sub-
samples and present the results in Models (4) and (5) of Table 6. The coefﬁcient of ITR retains its positive
sign in both speciﬁcations, which suggests that the main ﬁnding is relatively robust, even after removing
observations that use ROA during the crisis years.
Table 6
Alternative measures of insider trading restrictions, samples, and controlling for endogeneity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ITL ITS ENF2 Financial crisis
years
Non-ﬁnancial
crisis years
Change in ITR 2SLS
ITR 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(5.71)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(5.42)
0.002⁎⁎
(2.20)
CH_ITR 0.005⁎⁎⁎
(4.28)
ITL 0.010⁎⁎⁎
(13.62)
INS 0.004⁎⁎⁎
(8.98)
ENF2 0.003⁎
(1.80)
CLOSE −0.016⁎⁎⁎
(−12.22)
−0.017⁎⁎⁎
(−13.37)
−0.009⁎⁎⁎
(−2.65)
−0.022⁎⁎⁎
(−13.86)
−0.014⁎⁎⁎
(−9.44)
−0.020⁎⁎⁎
(−8.57)
−0.019⁎⁎⁎
(−15.01)
GDPG 0.097⁎⁎⁎
(9.81)
0.117⁎⁎⁎
(11.48)
0.053⁎⁎⁎
(3.36)
0.132⁎⁎⁎
(11.59)
0.047⁎⁎⁎
(2.99)
LAWORDER 0.001
(1.02)
0.002⁎⁎
(2.57)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−6.62)
−0.005⁎⁎⁎
(−5.00)
0.002⁎
(1.93)
ROA −0.117⁎⁎⁎
(−32.79)
−0.116⁎⁎⁎
(−32.78)
−0.124⁎⁎⁎
(−10.66)
−0.140⁎⁎⁎
(−28.38)
−0.098⁎⁎⁎
(−24.64)
−0.156⁎⁎⁎
(−20.06)
−0.115⁎⁎⁎
(−32.90)
LEV −0.004⁎⁎
(−1.97)
−0.004⁎⁎
(−2.30)
0.006
(1.21)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−3.04)
−0.002
(−0.77)
−0.002
(−0.70)
−0.004⁎⁎
(−2.00)
SALESG 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(12.11)
0.007⁎⁎⁎
(12.36)
0.002
(1.63)
0.007⁎⁎⁎
(10.30)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(6.73)
0.008⁎⁎⁎
(6.21)
0.007⁎⁎⁎
(12.94)
SIZE −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−36.99)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−38.78)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−12.27)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−32.72)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−35.13)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−22.78)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−40.38)
Country FE No No No No No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.274 0.271 0.168 0.285 0.260 0.319 0.268
Number of Observations 95,232 95,232 10,092 54,283 42,221 14,976 96,504
This table presents the regression results of earnings volatility (RISK) on insider trading restrictions (ITR) and other control variables. The
deﬁnitions of the variables are described in Appendix A. Models (1) to (3) present the results using insider trading law (ITL), strictness of
insider trading laws (ITS), andﬁrst time enforcement of insider trading laws (ENF2), respectively.Models (4) and (5) include observations
using ROA during the ﬁnancial crisis years and during non-ﬁnancial crisis years, respectively. Model (6) considers only the period when
there is a change in the insider trading restriction index, calculated as CH_ITR. Model (7) uses the corruption perception index from
Transparency International (2003) as an instrument for the insider trading restriction. The t-statistic for each coefﬁcient is reported in
the parenthesis and is based on White's heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm.
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.10 level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.05 level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 0.01 level.
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4.4. Controlling for endogeneity
In this sub-section, we explicitly control for the issue of endogeneity by implementing two tests. First,
we exploit the time-series variation in insider trading restrictions and consider the effect of an exoge-
nous change in the index on managerial risk-taking incentives. For this purpose, we compute the change
in the index score in the two years in which the index experiences changes (in 1998 and 1999). We com-
pute CH_ITR as the change in the insider trading index between 1998 and 1997 and between 1999 and
1998. We then replace ITR with CH_ITR and re-estimate Eq. (2) for the shorter sample (14,976 ﬁrm–
year observations) using an OLS regression model with country, industry, and year ﬁxed effects. The re-
sults, as presented in Model (6) of Table 6, reveal that changes in insider trading restrictions are positive-
ly associated with corporate risk-taking, as the coefﬁcient of CH_ITR is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5% level.
Second, Du and Wei (2004) ﬁnd a positive association between legal corruption and insider trading. We
thus estimate a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) regression and use the corruption perception index (CPI)
from Transparency International (2003) as an instrument for the insider trading restriction index in the
ﬁrst-stage regression. The index ranges from0 to 10,with the lowest score of 1.9 for Indonesia and the highest
score of 9.7 for Finland. Higher scores for the index indicate less corruption. The results of the ﬁrst-stage re-
gression (unreported) show that the corruption perception index is positively and strongly associated with
the insider trading index (magnitude = 0.257, t-statistics = 16.14), suggesting that insider trading is more
restricted in countries that are perceived to have less corruption. In the second-stage regression, we replace
ITRwith the predicted values from the ﬁrst-stage regression and re-estimate Eq. (3) using the OLS regression
model with industry, and year ﬁxed effects. Model (7) of Table 6 shows that the main results are robust to
controlling for endogeneity, as the predicted values of insider trading restrictions are still positively and sig-
niﬁcantly associated with corporate risk-taking.
Table 7
Cross-sectional differences in stock market development and legal origin.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Low TRADE High TRADE Civil Law Common Law
ITR −0.009⁎⁎⁎
(−6.06)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(11.55)
−0.004⁎⁎⁎
(−4.66)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(3.56)
CLOSE −0.001
(−0.54)
−0.018⁎⁎⁎
(−10.89)
−0.004⁎⁎
(−2.09)
−0.014⁎⁎⁎
(−7.23)
GDPG 0.106⁎⁎⁎
(4.34)
−0.030⁎⁎⁎
(−2.78)
0.035⁎⁎⁎
(2.63)
−0.036⁎⁎⁎
(−2.63)
LAWORDER 0.006⁎⁎⁎
(3.93)
−0.004⁎⁎⁎
(−3.02)
0.001
(1.06)
0.004⁎⁎⁎
(2.73)
ROA 0.014⁎⁎⁎
(4.80)
0.012⁎⁎⁎
(4.74)
0.017⁎⁎⁎
(7.10)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(3.63)
LEV 0.005⁎⁎⁎
(4.41)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(10.51)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(5.92)
0.006⁎⁎⁎
(9.46)
SALESG −0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−18.48)
−0.009⁎⁎⁎
(−34.88)
−0.007⁎⁎⁎
(−23.39)
−0.008⁎⁎⁎
(−30.14)
SIZE −0.009⁎⁎⁎
(−6.06)
0.010⁎⁎⁎
(11.55)
−0.004⁎⁎⁎
(−4.66)
0.005⁎⁎⁎
(3.56)
Country FE No No No No
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 22,994 73,510 33,924 62,580
R-squared 0.179 0.187 0.173 0.182
This table presents the cross-sectional differences in the regression results of earnings variability (RISK) on insider trading restrictions
(ITR) and other control variables. Thedeﬁnitions of the variables are described inAppendixA. The t-statistic for each coefﬁcient is reported
in parentheses and is based on the White's heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm.
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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4.5. Cross-sectional variations in country-level institutions
In this sub-section, we examine the inﬂuence of country-level institutions on the effect of insider trading
restrictions on corporate risk-taking. Consistent with other cross-country studies, we employ two country-
level variables to proxy for the strength of institutional infrastructure: TRADE and LO. TRADE is deﬁned as
the average value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP for the 1996 to 2000 period, obtained from La
Porta et al. (2006). LO is a legal origin dummy variable that equals 1 for common-law countries and 0 for
civil-law countries, and is obtained from La Porta et al. (1998).
We further partition the sample into two groups comprising Low and High TRADE (based on the median
value of TRADE) and Civil Law and Common Law countries to investigate whether the results are driven by
countries with weak or strong institutions. Models (1) to (2) and (3) to (4) of Table 7 present the estimation
results of Eq. (3) using an OLS regression model with industry and year ﬁxed effects for the four smaller sub-
samples (Low vsHigh Trade; Civil vs Common Law). Interestingly, we document that ITR exhibits an asymmet-
ric relationship with RISK, depending on the institutional strength. To be more speciﬁc, we continue to ﬁnd a
positive and signiﬁcant association between ITR and RISK in the High TRADE and Common Law sub-samples
(Models (2) and (4)), which is consistent with our main ﬁndings in Table 4. However, the relationship be-
comes negative in the Low TRADE and Civil Law sub-samples (Models (1) and (3)).11 These results reinforce
the notion that changes inmanagerial incentives to undertake risky investment ventures due tomore restric-
tive insider trading regulations are different among ﬁrms in countries with strong versus weak institutions,
which supports H2.
4.6. Effect of insider trading restrictions on capital allocation decisions
Thus far, our main ﬁndings have highlighted the positive relationship between insider trading restric-
tions and corporate risk-taking. In this sub-section, we examine whether the increase in risk-taking is
beneﬁcial or harmful to ﬁrms, which is also an important question to investors and regulators. Although
there is no formal model that allows us to examine such a relationship, we adopt the approach taken by
Faccio et al. (2012) and further analyze the role of ITR on the efﬁciency of capital allocation decision. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we estimate Eq. (5) below, which is essentially a q-model of investment that is based on Fazzari
et al. (1988):
CAPEXi;t ¼ ao þ a1ITRi;t þ a2Qi;t þ a3 Qi;t  ITRi;t
 
þ a4CFi;t þ a5 CFi;t  ITRi;t
 
þ
X
Ctryiþ
X
Indiþ
X
Yrt þ εi;t ; ð5Þ
where CAPEX is the capital expenditures (computed as the ratio of the changes in net ﬁxed assets from year
t − 1 to year t to net ﬁxed assets at year t− 1);Q is Tobin'sQ (computed as the ratio ofmarket value of equity
plus book value of liabilities at year t to total assets at year t); and CF is the cash ﬂow (computed as the ratio of
net income plus depreciation at year t to net ﬁxed assets at year t− 1).12
Eq. (5) is estimated using the OLSmodel with country, industry, and year ﬁxed-effects; and the results
are presented in Model (1) of Table 8. We ﬁnd that ITR is positively and signiﬁcantly associated with cap-
ital investment decision. This ﬁnding is consistent with our main result and suggests that one possible
channel through which managers in countries with higher insider trading restrictions take more risks
is by increasing capital expenditures. Moreover, the interaction coefﬁcient ITR × Q (ITR × CF) is positive
(negative) and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Since Q is normally used as ameasure of investment
opportunity, the results imply that ﬁrms in countries with stricter insider trading laws will invest more
when managers anticipate that there are good investment opportunities in the market. Therefore,
there is some preliminary evidence to support the notion that managers in countries with stricter insider
11 Fernandes and Ferreira (2009) also document an asymmetric relationship between the initial enforcement of insider trading laws and
stock price informativeness. In particular, stock prices are more informative after insider trading laws are ﬁrst enforced only in countries
with strong institutions (developed countries). The relationship does not exist or becomes negative in countries with weak institutions
(emerging countries).
12 The deﬁnitions of these variables are similar to Faccio et al (2012).
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trading laws make more efﬁcient capital allocation decisions (see Baker et al., 2003; McLean et al.,
2012).13
To summarize, the results of our empirical analyses indicate that the ﬁnding of a positive relationship
between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking is robust to alternative measures of insider
trading restrictions, and alternative measures of risk-taking incentives and alternative speciﬁcations, and is
inﬂuenced by country-level institutions. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that the increase in
risk-taking is beneﬁcial to ﬁrms.
5. Conclusions
We employ international survey data on the prevalence of insider trading from the Global
Competitiveness Report as a measure of insider trading restrictions and examine their impact on corpo-
rate risk-taking in an international sample that covers 38 countries over the 1990 to 2003 period. We
provide evidence that managers in countries with more restrictive insider trading regulations engage
in more risk-taking initiatives than their counterparts in countries with less restrictive regulations. More
relevantly, our ﬁndings indicate that insider trading restrictions have a signiﬁcant incremental inﬂuence on
corporate risk-taking, which is independent of the effects of other country-level variables (such as investor
protection, law and order, accounting disclosures, and culture) as documented by the existing studies in
the literature.
Our empirical results are also robust to changes in regression speciﬁcations and sample periods. Further-
more, whenwe use two alternativemeasures of insider trading restrictions (insider trading law index and the
strictness of insider trading laws) and corporate risk-taking, our main ﬁndings remain unchanged. We also
address the issue of endogeneity, and the main results persist.
13 A closely related paper by Chen et al. (2013) examines whether the initial enforcement of insider trading laws affects ﬁrms' invest-
ment efﬁciency. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms' investment becomesmore efﬁcient (as measured by increases in investment-Q sensitivity) after in-
sider trading laws are enforced. This positive association is more prominent in countries with strong institutions such as investor
protection and disclosure quality requirements. Consequently, future accounting performance is also enhanced due to the improvement
in investment efﬁciency.
Table 8
Efﬁciency of capital allocation decisions.
(1)
ITR 0.091⁎⁎⁎
(14.70)
Q −0.017
(−1.44)
Q × ITR 0.012⁎⁎⁎
(5.13)
CF 1.904⁎⁎⁎
(16.23)
CF × ITR −0.332⁎⁎⁎
(−13.60)
Country FE Yes
Industry FE Yes
Year FE Yes
Observations 96,328
R-squared 0.172
This table presents the regression results of capital expenditures (CAPEX) on insider trading restrictions (ITR) and other control variables.
CAPEX is the ratio of the changes in net ﬁxed assets from year t − 1 to year t to net ﬁxed assets at year t − 1. Q is the ratio of market
value of equity plus book value of liabilities at year t to total assets at year t, CF is the ratio of net income plus depreciation at year t to net
ﬁxed assets at year t − 1. The t-statistic for each coefﬁcient is reported inparentheses and is based on theWhite's heteroskedasticity corrected
standard errors, clustered by ﬁrm.
⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
⁎⁎⁎ Denotes statistical signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
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Finally, the relationship between insider trading restrictions and corporate risk-taking is not uniform
across all countries. Although themain result exists for ﬁrms in countries withmore developed stockmarkets
and common law countries, we ﬁnd the opposite result for countries with less developed stock markets and
civil law countries. As such, our results demonstrate strong evidence of an asymmetric relationship that
depends on the strength of the country-level institutional infrastructure.
Overall, our study extends the debate on insider trading laws in the ﬁnance and accounting literature. In
particular, the empirical ﬁndings highlight that more restrictive insider trading laws encourage managers to
engage in initiatives that involve higher risks.Moreover, ourﬁndings have important implications to investors
and regulators as there is some preliminary evidence to suggest that the increase in risk-taking is beneﬁcial to
ﬁrms as the subsequent capital allocation decisions become more efﬁcient.
Appendix A
Deﬁnitions of the main variables and data sources.
Variable name Deﬁnition Source
Corporate risk-taking incentives
RISK Earnings volatility, calculated as the country and industry-adjusted standard
deviation of a ﬁrm's return on assets (ROA) over 5-year overlapping periods.
Worldscope
RISK2 Difference between the maximum and minimum of a ﬁrm's ROA over a
5-year interval.
Worldscope
RISK3 Research and development, calculated as the ratio of research and
development expenditure to total assets.
Worldscope
Country-level variables
ITR Insider trading restriction index. Global Competitiveness Report
(1996, 1998, 1999)
CH_ITR Change in the insider trading restriction index. Global Competitiveness Report
(1996, 1998, 1999)
ITL Insider trading law index. Beny (2004)
IT_ENF Indicates the ﬁrst year in which insider trading law was enforced. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)
ENF1 A dummy variable that equals 1 if a country enforced insider trading laws
for the ﬁrst time by 1996, and 0 otherwise.
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)
ENF2 A dummy variable that equals 1 for years after and including the ﬁrst-year of
enforcement of insider trading laws for a particular country, and 0 otherwise.
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002)
ITS Strictness of insider trading laws, calculated as a product of ITL and ENF1. Durnev and Nain (2007)
LAWORDER Law and order index. ICRG (2008)
GDPG GDP growth rate, calculated as the annual percentage change in the gross
domestic product (GDP), measured in 2005 constant US$.
World Bank
ANTISELF Anti-self-dealing index. Djankov et al. (2008)
ACTSTD Accounting standard index. La Porta et al. (1998)
UA Uncertainty avoidance index. Hofstede (2001)
INDIV Individualism index. Hofstede (2001)
CPI Corruption perception index. Transparency International (2003)
TRADE Average value of stocks traded as a percentage of GDP for the 1996–2000
period.
La Porta et al. (2006)
LO A dummyvariable that equals 1 for common-law countries, or 0 otherwise. La Porta et al. (1997)
Firm-level variables
CLOSE Insider ownership, calculated as the percentage of shares closely held by
insiders.
Worldscope
ROA Return on assets, calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation, and amortization to total assets.
Worldscope
LEV Leverage, deﬁned as total debt (short-term plus long-term) scaled by the
book value of total assets.
Worldscope
SALESG Sales growth, deﬁned as the average percentage change in total sales over
the sample period.
SIZE Firm size, deﬁned as the natural logarithm of total assets (inmillions of US$). Worldscope
Appendix A
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